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Abstract
This paper gives an online algorithm for generating Jakobsson’s fractal hash chains [14].
Our new algorithm compliments Jakobsson’s fractal hash chain algorithm for preimage
traversal since his algorithm assumes the entire hash chain is precomputed and a particular
list of ⌈logn⌉ hash elements or pebbles are saved. Our online algorithm for hash chain
traversal incrementally generates a hash chain of n hash elements without knowledge of n
before it starts. For any n, our algorithm stores only the ⌈logn⌉ pebbles which are precisely
the inputs for Jakobsson’s amortized hash chain preimage traversal algorithm. This compact
representation is useful to generate, traverse, and store a number of large digital hash chains
on a small and constrained device. We also give an application using both Jakobsson’s and
our new algorithm applied to digital chains of custody for validating dynamically changing
forensics data.
Keywords: Fractal hash chains, hash chain preimage traversal, hash chain traversal, digital
chains of custody, digital forensics, time-stamping.
1 Introduction
This paper proposes a digital forensics system for proactively capturing time-sensitive digital
forensics evidence. Intuitively, we are trying to build fully digital chains of custody for digital
evidence that provide forensics investigators with opportunities to enhance their data’s integrity.
Perhaps this system is best applied to monitor suspects that have already been identified. In
some cases, it is important to capture and validate dynamic evidentiary data. This may range
from tracking a very fast virus infection to tracking more slow changes directly made by human
touch. Even in monitoring slow changes to a file, capturing and validating an inappropriate
email–as it is generated–is far more convincing than just getting a snapshot of it retrospectively.
Generally, there is a web-of-trust for validating classical forensic evidence. This web may
include both witness and expert testimony as well as logical decuction given basic facts about a
situation. The evidence in this web is held together by a chain of custody. A chain of custody
is careful documentation of the evidence including details of all transfers of its possession for
examination. A chain of custody is used to authenticate evidentiary exhibits as well as to verify
these exhibits have not been modified.
∗An extended abstract of this paper is to appear in the Intelligence and Security Informatics 2007 (ISI 2007)
Conference.
†Department of Computer Science, The University of Alabama, 101 Houser Hall, Box 870290, Tuscaloosa, AL
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Our proposed system also initially depends on a web-of-trust. In particular, we must trust
the system administrators or even law enforcement for initiating our system under proper cir-
cumstances. This may be fleshed out in the usual ways using witnesses, experts, and logical
decuction given facts of the case. We maintain a full hash chain of the dynamic evidence for
the following reasons: (1) to document and sychronize the dynamic and time-specific nature of
change in a system, (2) to allow repeated verifications of the data under scrutiny, and (3) in the
cases where the hash elements include diverse swaths of compressed data may give extensive
opportunites for validation using webs-of-trust.
Our system is based on carefully timed hash chains on small constrained tamper-resistant
devices. These timed hash chains are constructed with compressed snapshots of evidence while
using (suspected) one-way hash functions. Generally, the amount of data or the length of time
for data capture is not known in advance for proactively monitoring forensics data. Thus, the
constrained nature of the hardware, variable granularity of the data, and unknown: time and
number of hash chains makes it likely that these devices cannot hold sufficient complete hash
chains. Likewise, such devices cannot hold a large set of time-stamps with compressed digital
finger-prints such as hashs.
It is standard forensics practice to use at least three well-known hash functions to verify
data integrity in case one or more of these functions is ever compromised [5, 17]. Such integrity
checks may be used for verifying a disk’s data. In our case, they may also be used to vali-
date dynamic changes in a critical file. Alternatively, hash chains use deferred disclosure to
establish time-synchronized authenticity. A hash chain can chronologically document evidence
by generating a timed hash chain forward while including diverse data of interest in the hash
inputs. Such evidence may be verified by traversing the hash chain backwards while supplying
the correct inputs at the proper times. This may include data that may be logically deduced
about data captured in the broader system itself. The backwards hash chain traversal allows re-
peated verification by only going back in the hash chain as far as appropriate–leaving the other
concealed hash elements in the chain for subsequent deferred verification. Data may be verified
by both sides in a trial, in addition to the forensic investigator. To preserve data integrity, each
time data is verified, each constrained device will release another hash element generated prior
to all already verified hash elements. This deferred disclosure validates the known elements in
the hash chain and it may tie in to different webs-of-trust.
Another approach is to have each device hold the first and last hash element of a hash chain.
Generally, a forensics verifier would start at the beginning of the hash chain and present the
appropriate data to verify the entire hash chain or a large subset of the hash chain. However,
such large subsets of the hash chain should include either the first or last element of the hash
chain for validity and verification.
Assuming the investigator or system administrator that initiated the hash chain-based data
capture is trustworthy. The data then is in the domain of the evidence clerk maintaining the
chain of custody. Subsequently, the hash chain evidence may be called in to question: is this
the correct data? The first challenge to this approach is if the start (or an early element) of
the hash chain is discovered by an attacker, then another fictitious constrained device may be
created that ‘verifies’ incorrect or modified data. In evidence storage, replacing a gun with
another with different serial number or bullet grooves is hard not to miss. That is, given the
first element of a trusted hash chain gives an attacker an opportunity to generate and fake the
rest of the hash chain, except for the last element. The last hash element may be at the center
of the contention. If there is a single end element of the hash chain that disagrees, whose do we
trust? Thus, we have three hash chains that only reveal their elements on-demand by deferred
validation: the trusted investigator or system administrator can validate the first or early hash
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Figure 1: Two Critical Time Boundaries t0 and t1 for Evidence E . Time increases from left to
right and assume t1 − t0 may be small, for instance as small as 10
−6 of a second.
elements. In fact, ideally there would be enough hash elements that they would not have to
reveal the last hash element. This situation is reminicant of the motivation for Schneier and
Kelsey [24]’s audit logs.
Another possibility is to determine the first time step that verifies critical data. However,
authenticating the first critical data item requires the prior hash element. If it is useful to
validate this ‘prior hash element,’ we must traverse the hash chain back two hash elements from
the critical data, etc. This is the second challenge to storing the first and last hash elements of
a hash chain on a constrained device: repeatedly validating critical data each time the data is
examined through deferred disclosure requires us to traverse the hash chain backwards.
Computer forensics strives to understand the relationships between suspects and events so
they can be verified by third parties such as jurors in a court of law. In such situations it is
critical to establish strong credence of the validity of digital forensics evidence. Digital evidence
is abstract, ephemeral, time-sensitive, compact, complex, and often encoded. In some cases,
biological evidence has measurable decay characteristics that allow chronologic analysis [20].
Digital evidence does not have such measurable decay characteristics. Also, digital evidence is
easily copied and copies may be readily manipulated to challenge valid evidence and diminish
its credibility.
The digital forensics system proposed here is applied to maintaining timed digital evidence.
Figure 1 illustrates a central application addressed in this paper. This challenge is the interval
time-stamping problem [1, 11, 18, 28]. Consider the left-to-right time line containing the time
interval [t0, t1]. A central challenge is to demonstrate that the evidence E was in a particular
user’s possession between times t0 and t1. The value t1− t0 may be very small. It is well known
that when using public key systems, along with prominent and well distributed data, it is easy
to show E existed after time t1. However, how does one show E existed at or before time t0?
One approach is to divide the interval
[
t0 −
t1−t0
k , t1
]
into k + 1 smaller intervals each of size
t1−t0
k . In each smaller interval [t0,i, t1,i] it may be shown that E existed after time t1,i, for each
i : k > i ≥ 1 where t1,0 = t1. Thus, we can show E existed before time t1,k = t0.
Throughout this paper, all logs are base 2.
1.1 Our Contributions
This paper proposes constrained devices for securing and validating time-sensitive (and dy-
namic) forensic data. It assumes tamper-resistant hardware, which may be viewed as a depen-
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dency on a trusted third party. A special online algorithm is given here to prevent a modify-
and-copy attack. This online algorithm allows computer forensics specialists to maintain the
verifiability of timed digital evidence.
Take an easy to compute hash function h. Assume h is one-way [10]: So, on average it is
intractable to invert h. That is, given y where y ← h(x) it is on average intractable to find x
given y. Given a hash function h where x← h(y), then y is the preimage of x.
Next is a n+ 1 element hash chain:
v0
h(v1)
←− v1
h(v2)
←− v2
h(v3)
←− · · ·
h(vn−1)
←− vn−1
h(vn)
←− vn. (1)
Since the hash function is one-way, this hash chain must be initially generated from right
to left.
Definition 1 Consider a hash chain as described by Equation 1. The value vn is the seed of
the hash chain.
Generating the hash values forward in this order vn, vn−1, · · · , v0 is hash chain traversal.
Computing hash elements backward in this order v0, v1, · · · , vn is preimage traversal.
For efficient hash chain traversal see [13]. We always assume the hash function is well known.
Using deferred disclosure of hash elements backwards validates prior knowledge of elements in
the hash chain. In time step 0, given v0, then waiting to time step 1 one can verify that
v0 = h(v1) indicating with high probability v0 and v1 are from the same source.
At time step i, our scheme inputs a chunk of digital evidence Ei. Let c(Ei) be the compressed
version of Ei. Say c(Ei) contains a modest number of fixed bits, for instance 160 bits [26, 27].
For example, for the function c we can use a technique such as Merkle-Damg˚ard construction
of a collision-resistant compression function. Then vi ⊕ c(Ei) is the input to the hash function
h giving:
vi−1 ← h(vi ⊕ c(Ei))
and this process is continued in a carefully timed fashion to give an entire hash chain. The
function ‘⊕’ may be either xor or concatenation.
If a hash chain is completely exposed an adversary has access to all elements of
C1 = vn, vn−1, vn−2, · · · , v0
then this hash chain’s relative and carefully timed deferred disclosure based authenticity may
be easily challenged. For instance, an attacker may take vn−k and falsify the input En−k by
changing it to E ′n−k, then generate the incorrect hash chain:
C2 = vn, · · · , vn−k, v
′
n−k−1, · · · , v
′
0
where v′n−k−i 6= vn−k−i, for all i : n− k ≥ i ≥ 0.
Now, without proofs of identity or authenticity, which chain C1 or C2 represents the au-
thenticated data is not clear. Of course, proofs of identity or authenticity are only as good as
the systems checking them.
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Given a hash chain with hash seed vn and the last hash element v0. Suppose we only save
vn and v0 on a small constrained device to validate the data from n different times
En−1, · · · , E0.
If Ei is the first piece of critical data in hash element vi, then to validate vi, we must know
vi+1. But, the next time the same hash chain is validated, we take Ei+1 and validate it with
vi+2. As these validation steps are repeated each time investigators weigh the evidence, we will
be performing a (slow and deliberate) preimage traversal of the hash chain.
The hash chain forward traversal algorithm given in this paper extends Jakobsson’s work
by augmenting his hash chain preimage backward traversal algorithm [14]. See also, [7]. Our
algorithm uses hash chains to validate forensics evidence by generating the hash chain elements
forward
vn, vn−1, · · · , v0
online but only storing ⌈log2 n⌉ hash elements for a hash chain of n total hash elements. The
preimages of such a hash chain may then be output using Jakobsson’s algorithm and validated by
an evidence clerk. To best ensure the evidence’s credence, it is best for the clerk to only compute
the backward preimage traversal as far as necessary. Then, additional deferred disclosures may
be performed as needed to re-authenticate the validity of the exposed hash elements.
A difficulty is in validating a hash chain by backward preimage traversal in memory times
computational complexity of less than O(n) where n is the number of hashes required, see for
example [14, 7, 8, 25, 19].
This paper gives an online algorithm for generating a forward hash chain traversal while
always storing pebbles to be used for backwards preimage traversal by Jakobsson’s algorithm.
The online algorithm grows a hash chain as requested to any length n, but never requires storing
more than ⌈log n⌉ hash elements or pebbles, where n hash elements have been generated so far.
This is important on memory constrained devices. For any n, the ⌈log n⌉ pebbles can be directly
plugged into Jakobsson’s algorithm to start backward preimage traversal for verification.
If n is the number of hash elements stored, other recent methods applicable to emitting hash
elements, double the size to 2n to store a single additional element–the (n+1)-st element. This
is not acceptable here for several reasons: (1) our approach depends on precisely timed hash
element generation and generating n more hash elements may cause a simple and constrained
device to miss data collection; and (2) the constrained devices may not have the storage to hold
n additional hash elements.
1.2 Previous Work
Secure audit logs applied to digital forensics were developed by Schneier and Kelsey [24]. This
work assumes three machines: a trusted secure server T , an small machine who secure state is
untrusted U for keeping audit logs and a sometimes trusted verifier V. The audit log machine
U is a small constrained machine that is only occasionally securely connected to T . A machine
U is trusted until it is compromised. If it is compromised, then it cannot change its audit
log or read audit elements before the compromise occurred. This system uses a hash chain to
secure the audit logs on the untrusted machines. But, each untrusted machine deletes all but
the last element in the hash chain as the audit log grows. Only T has the seed of hash chain
for verification. Our online algorithm along with Jakobsson’s can be applied to variations of
Schneier and Kelsey’s audit log system. This would save space and potentially allow numerous
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hash chains to serve as audit logs. They close their audit log with a ‘normalCloseMessage’ to
prevent an adversary from extending it illicitly.
To our knowledge, all hash chain preimage traversal work to date assumes either (1) the
hash chain is computed in advance, or (2) the length of the hash chain is known or a bound on
the length is known in advance, or (3) given 2t hash elements, the hash chain may be doubled
in size to 2t+1 hash elements when the (2t + 1)-st element is needed, for t a positive integer.
The first case does not seem directly applicable to our digital forensics scheme. In the last
two of these cases, there may be a good deal of excess unused memory.
1.2.1 Time-Stamping
Time-stamping is a significant area of research. Haber and Stornetta [11] gave time-stamping
schemes using both hash chains and digital signatures. This is similar to the hash chain scheme
used in this paper. The first method they give is a linking scheme using hash chains to maintain
temporal integrity. All of their schemes depend on a trusted third party. The trusted third party
provides a time-stamping service which applies a hash function and digitally signs it. Other
related schemes and improvements were given in this paper as well as Bayer, Haber, Stornetta [2]
and Haber and Stornetta [12]. Buldas, Laud, Lipmaa and Villemson [4] focus on ‘relative
temporal authentication’ and give both time-stamping requirements and new algorithms suited
to these requirements. Their methods require a trusted third party to provide time-stamping
services. Ansper, Buldas, Saarepera, and Willemson [1] discuss linkage based protocols (i.e.,
hash chain based protocols) compared to hash-and-sign time-stamping protocols. Building on
work of Willemson [28], Lipmaa [18] gives efficient algorithms to traverse skewed trees. Our
paper uses basic time-stamping by hash chains. Though the focus is on constrained devices and
digital forensics.
1.2.2 Hash Chain Traversal
Our forward hash chain traversal is based on Jakobsson’s backward hash chain preimage traver-
sal work, see also Coppersmith and Jakobsson [7]. Jakbosson gives an asymptotically optimal
algorithm to compute consecutive preimages of hash chains. His algorithm requires ⌈log n⌉ stor-
age and ⌈log n⌉ hash evaluations per hash element output. This is assuming O(n) preprocessing
was used to build the hash chain of n elements.
Coppersmith and Jakobsson [7] give an algorithm with amortized time-space product cost
of about 12 log
2 n per hash chain element. This is also assuming O(n) preprocessing was used to
build the hash chain of n elements. They also give the following lower bound: Computing any
element of the hash chain in the worst-case requires a time-space trade-off TS ≥ log
2 n
4 , where T
is the number of invocations of the hash function and S is the number of stored hash elements.
Sella [25] gives a general solution that applies k hash function evaluations to generate any
element in a hash chain, while storing (k−1)n1/(k−1) total hash elements. His algorithm initially
stores hash elements that are at constant intervals of distance (k−1)n1/(k−1). Kim [15, 16] gives
algorithms that improve Sella’s in saving up to half of the space Sella’s algorithms use while
keeping the same parametric space and hash evaluation costs. This means Kim’s algorithm uses
at most the same space as Jakobsson’s algorithm.
Ben-Amram and Petersen [3] give an algorithm for backing up in a singly linked list of
length n in O(nǫ) time, for any ǫ > 0. This requires O(n) pre-processing of the linked list.
Matias and Porat [19] give list and graph traversal data structures that allow efficient back-
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ward list traversal and very efficient forward traversal. Their ‘skeleton’ data structures allow
complete back traversals in O(kn1/k) amortized time given k elements in storage. Thus, storing
k = O(log n) elements, their algorithm requires O(log i) amortized element evaluations for the
i-th backward traversal, where i ≤ n. They bring out several interesting applications beyond
hash chains. If their data structures are built for lists of n elements, then to accommodate n+1
elements they build a new data structure (list synopsis) for 2n+1 total elements, see subsection
4.3 of the full version of [19].
1.3 Structure of this Paper
In the remainder of the paper we develop the ideas behind our proposed approach. Section 2
gives our model. Section 3 reviews Jakobsson’s algorithm in detail. We give proofs of correctness
for this algorithm in the appendix. In order to prove the correctness of our algorithm we found
it necessary to supply detailed proofs of Jakobsson’s algorithm (which were not given directly in
Jakobsson’s paper). Section 4 introduces the specifics of our online algorithm, discusses how it
interfaces with Jakobsson’s amortized algorithm, and gives a proof of correctness. In Section 5
we give some conclusions.
2 Chains of Custody: Physical and Digital
Next is a formal definition of a chain of custody.
Definition 2 A chain of custody is a detailed account documenting the handling and access to
evidence.
We quote Colquitt [6, Page 484] on the purpose of a chain of custody:
“The purpose, then, of establishing a chain of custody is to satisfy the court that it
is reasonably probable that the exhibit is authentic and that no one has altered or
tampered with the proffered physical exhibit.”
A chain of custody, as described in Definition 2, may sometimes be referred to as a classic
chain of custody. Maintaining a chain of custody is a standard practice investigators use to
inextricably link the evidence that ties a crime to the suspects.
Digital evidence is often stored using a classical chain of custody. For example, documenting
when a particular individual first picked up a disk drive with critical evidence, the state of the
disk drive, to whom and when they transferred the drive, etc.
Digital evidence is extraordinarily easy to copy. Using standard techniques, each copy of
digital evidence is easily authenticated. Physical evidence is somewhat different [11, 20]. Con-
sider a crime committed by using a gun. Manufacturing a new .357 Magnum Ruger Blackhawk
Flattop revolver with an identical ‘look,’ serial number, and bullet grooves, to one used in a
crime is extraordinary work. Just finding experts to replicate such physical evidence would
generally leave a substantial paper trail. Moreover, biological evidence generally also provides
time frames. Thus, classic chains of custody often focus on the basic identification, authen-
tication, uniqueness, and time. Digital data lacks such uniqueness and timing characteristics.
That is, many copies may be made of digital evidence both for legitimate and illicit reasons.
Furthermore, timestamps alone may not be sufficiently convincing.
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Definition 3 A digital chain of custody is the information preserved about the data and its changes
that shows specific data was in a particular state at a given date and time.
A DCoC (Digital Chain of Custody) is a small constrained device for holding, authenticating,
and verifying a digital chain of custody.
Take a one-way hash function h. Suppose h has deterministic and tightly bounded time
complexity. There are some hash functions with bounded time complexity that are already
in use: the RSA SecurID [23] as well as systems like TESLA [21, 22] depend on timed hash
functions. This paper goes one step further advocating extremely precisely timed hash functions.
This paper is focused on several aspects of evidence maintenance that are related to time
stamping, see for example [8]. One side of the challenge is to show a piece of evidence existed
after a particular point in time. Using the Merkle-Damg˚ard technique, the evidence may be
combined with non-predictable, widely distributed, and time sensitive documents such as a
newspaper or financial market data∗.
Similar discussions to the next definition can be found in several places, for example [11, 27].
Definition 4 Data that is non-predictable, widely distributed, verifiably stored, and time sensitive
is socially bound data.
A critical issue is that socially bound and highly granular data are not common. In certain
situations, socially bound data must be highly granular, for example in milliseconds. Thus,
carefully timed hash chains may be used as a proxy for socially bound data. See also, timestamp
linkages in [11].
2.0.1 The Adversary
The adversary this paper assumes is either (1) an untrustworthy verifier; or (2) a general attack
against known hash functions on a DCoC.
Suppose our system computes an n element hash chain vn, · · · , v0, and say n > t. An
untrustworthy verifier may get an element of a hash chain vt along with the files of digital
evidence E = Et, · · · , E0. The adversary may illicitly modify the evidence to E
′ = E ′t, · · · , E
′
0
and compute a ‘competing’ hash chain using vt and E
′. Thus, adding doubt to the validity of the
real evidence. Provided t < n, and the one-way hash function h is not broken, we can validate
the hash chain based on E and not E′ by producing vt+1 and showing that h(vt+1⊕c(Et+1)) = vt.
The issue of a general breach of a hash function is primarily dealt with by following the
forensics policy of having at least three different known hash functions for the data. This
procedure is to ensure trust in the hash functions in case one of them is no longer trustworthy [5].
2.1 Overview of Our Approach
This paper assumes a model consisting of at least three constrained devices (DCoCs or cards)
each having a different hash function. These constrained devices may be interfaced using a USB
2.0, for instance. In any case, these devices have a small processor as well as limited memory.
They are tamper resistant.
∗As financial markets become more automated and distributed, it may be feasible for the trading volume to
be granulated down to minute fractions of a second. For example, in 2004 the average NYSE trading day volume
per second was about 1, 500, 000, 000/(60 · 60 · 6.5) or more than 64,000 shares per second. See www.nyse.com.
The volume is known down to the individual share. This highly granular data may be widely distributed.
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2.1.1 Data Capture
The DCoCs may each interface through separate USB 2.0 ports simultaneously to gather com-
mon snapshots of critical system states and memory. Each DCoC may be physically secured
and transported independently by a different member of law enforcement. We assume these
devices will be mass produced so that each DCoC has unique authentication software. (They
should also have unique physical identification.) Different members of law enforcement should
handle each card making it less likely that all cards may be manipulated by a single member
of law enforcement. Furthermore, from physical identification, the DCoCs may become part of
the classical chains of custody.
Finally, each of the DCoCs may periodically authenticate each other while capturing data.
Records of these authentications can be included in the hashed values. This authentication
should be zero-knowledge interactive proofs of identity such as the Feige-Fiat-Shamir proto-
col [9]. Such a proof of identity is important in this application domain since these proofs of
identity are not transitive. Thus, a fake DCoC cannot impersonate a real one by just mimicking
its proof of identity.
2.1.2 Forensic Data Verification
The plaintext evidence and diversifying data has been stored as the files M in plain sight on
storage such as an optical disk. Different states or snap-shots of the evidence will be periodically
concatenated into timed inputs of the hash chain. Suppose the hash computations run at a fixed
and known speed on tamper resistant hardware. Thus, computing a hash chain on this special
hardware can be used to certify the initial data states at specified times, see also Haber and
Stornetta [11].
The verification procedure is done by an evidence clerk and consists of the following steps:
1. Connect all three DCoCs to a secured verification machine. Initially, each DCoC is au-
thenticated to all other DCoCs using a zero-knowledge interactive proof of identity.
2. The DCoCs only output hash elements backwards on an as-needed basis to verify the
evidence under consideration.
3. As hash chain elements are output, the verification must continue with each hash element
step. If a DCoC cannot authenticate another device, then it will alert the evidence clerk
or even shut down.
4. The hash elements from a DCoC are sent out from left to right:
hn(vn ⊕ c(En)), h
n−1(vn−1 ⊕ c(En−1)), · · · , h
t(vt ⊕ c(Et)),
for n− 1 ≥ t. Moreover, hn(vn ⊕ c(En)) is verified by computing
h(hn−1(vn−1 ⊕ c(En−1))⊕ c(En)),
and so on.
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2.1.3 Putting It All Together
Given the tamper resistant hardware, just storing data with associated time stamps may quickly
overflow a constrained device–especially if the time granularity is very fine. Thus, compressed
representation of hash chains can be used to verify time stamps along with the authenticity of
other constrained devices.
It is possible to publicly post data from a system under forensic investigation by way of a
proxy server. This data may be signed by a small device and posted to a public (or private and
trusted) location. Small devices may have trouble signing large amounts of data due to their
constraints. Furthermore, for very fine time granularity, fast and consistent network bandwidth
may not be available. In some contexts, if data is captured before a formal investigation is
initiated, then it may be important to keep the suspects unaware that data is being captured
as potential evidence.
A DCoC may run its hash chain until a forensic examiner or law enforcement officer carefully
checks it into the physical chain of custody while noting the time in detail. This allows a forensic
examiner to determine the time of the evidence by counting the exact number of hashes. A
key motivator of our online algorithm is in proactive forensics the value of n is not known in
advance. Where n is the number of time-steps recorded by the DCoCs. In the case of a digital
chain of custody, it can not be known precisely how long it will take to get potential evidence
to an evidence clerk. Or how long an evidence clerk will take to validate the data, etc. This
precise time as well as the interval between hashes, computed by our algorithm, will have to be
known in advance to fake a hash chain.
The preprocessing phase of Jakobsson’s amortized algorithm must know the value of n in
advance of when it is run [14]. Our new algorithm prepares the appropriate ⌈log n⌉ pebbles
for Jakobsson’s algorithm, for any n. During hash element generation, for any n the online
algorithm never stores more than ⌈log n⌉ pebbles. Once the online algorithm has no more
requests to generate new hash elements, then the amortized algorithm [14] may be immediately
started.
3 Jakobsson’s Algorithm
This section reviews Jakobsson’s Algorithm [14]. The proofs of correctness are in the Appendix.
Some of these proofs are used in the results of Section 4.
3.1 A Review of Jakobsson’s Algorithm
Given a hash chain with 16 elements, Jakobsson’s algorithm is initialized as indicated in Table
1. In this Table, hash element 16 is the seed of the hash chain. Where the preimages are exposed
sequentially in the following order: 1, 2, · · · , 16. In general, the position of a hash element in a
hash chain ranges from 1, · · · , n where hash element 1 is the first element to be exposed in a
pre-image traversal. Thus, hash element n is the seed of the hash chain.
Element Position 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Pebble Placement × × × ×
Table 1: Initial pebble locations for Jakobsson’s algorithm
Suppose n = |H| is the number of hash values in the entire hash chain. In this case,
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Jakobsson’s amortized algorithm only stores ⌈log n⌉ hash pebbles.
Suppose n = 2k for some integer k. Now, Jakobsson’s algorithm [14] is given:
3.1.1 Jakobsson’s Setup.
Compute the entire hash chain: v0, v1, · · · , vn.
For pebble p[j], where j : k = log2 n ≥ j ≥ 1:
p[j].Start Increment ← 3× 2j
p[j].Dest Increment ← 2j+1
p[j].Position ← 2j
p[j].Destination ← 2j
p[j].Value ← v2j
Furthermore,
Current.Position ← 0
Current.Value ← v0
3.1.2 Jakobsson’s Main.
This algorithm in Figure 2 updates the pebbles and values.
Using Jakobsson’s amortized technique [14], a hash chain of size n requires a total of k
pebbles where k = ⌈log n⌉. This amortized algorithm performs O(log n) hash applications
per hash element output. Initially, in the setup phase, the pebbles store hash elements from
hash-chain positions 21, 22, 23, . . . , 2k, respectively.
4 Online Output of Jakobsson’s Pebbles for any n
Jakobsson’s amortized algorithm works to conserve both stored pebbles and hash evaluations.
This allows his algorithm to verify hash values on small sensors. This algorithm assumes pre-
processing where all hash elements are pre-computed, perhaps by a more powerful processor [14].
Our aim with the online algorithm is to have a small constrained device that generates
all requested hash elements. The online algorithm broadens the applicability of Jakobsson’s
amortized algorithm. In particular, the online algorithm generates all hash elements, but only
stores ⌈log n⌉ pebbles at any one time. Where n is the total number of hash element generated
so far. Every time a new hash element is generated, no additional hash evaluations must be
performed.
These ⌈log n⌉ hash pebbles are positioned so that at any point the online algorithm is
no longer invoked, then Jakobsson’s amortized algorithm can start to be run directly on the
pebbles. Thus, we believe the amortized and online algorithms are complimentary and fit well
together.
In Jakobsson’s notation each hash element keeps its index throughout the computation,
v0, · · · , vn.
11
Given an entire precomputed computed hash chain:
v1, v2, · · · , vn, then compute the pebble positions & auxiliary information.
1. if Current.Position = n, then
Stop
else
Current.Position← 1 +Current.Position
endif
2. for j ← 1 to k do
if p[j].Position 6= p[j].Destination then
2.1 p[j].Position ← p[j].Position − 2
2.2 p[j].Value← h(h(p[j].Value))
endif
endfor
3. if Current.Position is odd then
output h(p[1].Value)
else
output p[1].Value
3.1 p[1].Position ← p[1].Position + p[1].Start Increment
3.2 p[1].Destination← p[1].Destination+ p[1].Dest Increment
if p[1].Destination > n then
p[1].Position ← +∞
p[1].Destination← +∞
else
p[1].Value← FindValue
endif
Sort Pebbles by Position
endif
Figure 2: Jakobsson’s Hash-Chain Pebble Position update
This is because n is fixed, so all hash element numbers remain the same. The pebbles in
Jakobsson’s algorithm are re-numbered, according to the initial fixed hash element numbers,
and sorted by their positions.
The notation for the online algorithm uses hash element index notation that changes the
index values over time.
For instance, in Jakobsson’s preimage traversal algorithm, suppose the initial n hash ele-
ments are:
u1, · · · , un.
Then, after the first element is verified, it is discarded and the following hash elements remain:
u2, · · · , un.
Alternatively, since n is not fixed in our online algorithm, suppose the following list of
elements has already been generated (with only the appropriate pebbles saved),
w1, · · · , wn.
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                     Columns Represent The Same Hash Link
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
10 11 12 13 14 15 16
11 12 13 14 15 16
12 13 14 15 16
13 14 15 16
14 15 16
15 16
16
Jakobsson's Algorithm (Link Exposure)
    Grey cells represent traversal of cells from closest pebble.
Figure 3: Jakobsson’s Algorithm: Each row from top to bottom represents the state of a hash
chain traversed by Jakobsson’s algorithm. Each row represents a single hash element exposure.
For each row, bold and underlined positions represent the location of pebbles where Position
= Destination. Bold positions represent a temporary location for a pebble in transit only.
When a pebble is reached and moved it is moved to the back of a grey area and moves to the
front of the grey area or sequence of grey areas until it reaches its destination (and is underlined
and in the next row).
Then, generating another hash value w0 ← h(w1). This gives n + 1 total hash elements, thus
for simplicity all hash indices are increased by 1. This gives the following renumbering,
w1, · · · , wn+1.
Take vi, then it corresponds to wj, where
j = i− (2σ − totalHashElements), (2)
where σ is the total number of pebbles and totalHashElements is the number of hash elements
constructed thus far, also totalHashElements ≤ 2σ. Note, that when totalHashElements =
2σ, then we verify i = j by Observation 1 in the appendix.
Fact 1 Jakobsson’s notation and our notation corresponds exactly when n = 2k for some integer
k ≥ 0.
The online algorithm has two distinct, non-interweavable phases: The growth phase, and
the exposure phase.
4.1 The Growth Phase
Next is the growth phase.
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                     Columns Represent The Same Hash Link
1
1 2
1 2 3
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
             Hash Growth Algorithm
Figure 4: Online Algorithm: As before, each row represents a hash element exposure. For each
row bold and underlined positions represent the location of pebbles.
4.1.1 The Online Algorithm’s Setup
seed ← the initial hash value
totalHashElements ← 1
grow.value ← seed
grow.pebble ← 1
exponent ← 1
4.1.2 The Online Algorithm’s Init Pebble
InitializePebble(p, j,grow.value)
p[j].Move Increment← 2j+1
p[j].Start Increment← 3× 2j
p[j].Dest Increment← 2j+1
p[j].Position← 2j
p[j].Destination← 2j
p[j].Value← grow.value
Figure 5: Initialize Pebble
4.1.3 The Online Algorithm’s Main
Figure 6 updates the pebbles and values.
4.2 The Online Algorithm’s Exposure Phase
In this phase, only the setup is different from Jakobsson’s original algorithm, because we are
no longer assuming that exactly 2j pebbles must be present.
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while not done growing hash chain do
grow.value← h(grow.value)
totalHashElements← totalHashElements+ 1
1. if totalHashElements− 1 = 2k for some integer k ≥ 1, then
exponent← exponent+ 1
for all pebbles l do
p[l].Position← p[l].Position+ 2exponent−1
endfor
j ← grow.pebble
Create pebble p[j]
InitializePebble(p, j,grow.value)
p[j].distancefromSeed← totalHashElements
grow.pebble← grow.pebble+ 1
2. else
for all pebbles l do
t← p[l].Move Increment+ p[l].distancefromSeed+ 1
3. if totalHashElements = t then
3.1 p[l].Value← grow.value
3.2 p[l].distancefromSeed← totalHashElements
p[l].Position← p[l].Position − p[l].Move Increment
endif
endfor
endif
endwhile
j ← grow.pebble
4. Create pebble p[j] where j ← grow.pebble
InitializePebble(p, j, seed)
p[j].distancefromSeed← 0
Sort pebbles by Position
Figure 6: Hash Chain Growth Algorithm
4.2.1 The Online Algorithm’s Setup
For j ← 1 to ⌈log n⌉ do
p[j].destination ← p[j].position
Furthermore, we must also initialize the next lines
current.position ← totalHashElements
current.value ← grow.value
The online algorithm’s Main function is performed exactly as Jakobsson’s algorithm with
the exception that current.position cannot simply be set to zero during the setup phase, but
rather must be determined from the value of the first pebble in the sorted order.
15
4.3 Characteristics of the Hash Chain Growth Algorithm
To prove the validity of the Hash Chain Growth Algorithm we will show: (1) at each step of the
hash chain growth there are always enough pebbles, and (2) the pebbles are always properly
placed such that Jackobsson’s algorithm can immediately begin to run on the stored data from
the generated hash chain.
Recall, given n = 2t, for some integer t, then pebbles are placed in hash element positions
t = log n, t− 1 = log(n/2), t− 2 = log(n/4), · · · , t = 1.
For any initial pebble p[j] the value p[j].Destination never decreases in Jakobsson’s algo-
rithm. Thus, to determine on which move back the initial pebble p[j] will be output, compute
when
p[j].Destination > n
first occurs.
Assume n is a power of 2, and the definition of D(j, k) can be found in the appendix, and
given a fixed j solve for the minimal k so that
2j + k · 2j+1 > 2logn
2k > 2logn−j − 1.
For instance, for j = log(n/2), then k = 1 gives
2k = 2 > 2logn−(logn−1) − 1
> 2− 1 = 1,
which holds.
Fact 2 Let n = 2k. In Jakobsson’s algorithm, pebbles are eliminated in the reverse order of their
original indices j = k− 1, · · · , 1 where we consider the seed pebble at j = k to never be discarded.
Proof: This proof follows from Jakobsson’s algorithm in Figure 2. By Fact 17 of the appendix,
it must be that only the pebble in initial position j = k−1 = log(n/2) is going to be eliminated
immediately after Jakobsson’s algorithm generates and emits n/2 hash elements.
Now, suppose the hash elements are renumbered where 1 represents hash element n/2 + 1;
2 represents hash element n/2 + 2, all the way to n/2 represents hash element n. Still n = 2k.
By Fact 19 of the appendix, with this re-numbering, the remaining pebbles will be placed
at pebble positions
21, 22, · · · , 2k−1,
where n/2 = 2k−1. The pebble in position p[k − 1] is the seed of the hash chain, so it never
moves. By Corollary 1 also of the appendix, for each of these remaining pebbles,
p[j].Position = p[j].Destination.
However, for any initial pebble p[j] the value p[j].Destination never decreases in the al-
gorithm of Figure 2. Thus, we need to determine what initial pebble p[j] is placed in position
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2k−2 = n/4. This new position is one backward move beyond the n/2nd emitted hash element.
Thus, theDest Increment of this pebble must be 2k−2 = n/4, so the initial pebble was p[k−2].
Furthermore, by Fact 17, this pebble is the second pebble to be discarded.
The proof is completed by induction.
The next facts follow from the online algorithm in Figure 6.
Fact 3 Consider the online hash growth algorithm (see Figure 6). A new pebble is only created
when totalHashElements is such that
2k + 1 = totalHashElements,
for some k ≥ 1.
Proof: This is a direct result of line 1 of the online hash growth algorithm.
Any time 2k = totalHashElements−1, then between now and when 2k−1 = totalHashElements−
1, all of the pebble’s positions must be shifted by 2k−1. This is done in Figure 6 before a new
pebble is created.
Fact 4 Consider the online hash growth algorithm (see Figure 6). Each time an element is added
to the chain, totalHashElements is incremented by one.
Fact 5 Consider the online hash growth algorithm (see Figure 6). Each time a pebble is created it
is initialized as,
p[j].distancefromSeed ← totalHashElements.
This follows directly from section 1 of Figure 6.
Fact 6 Consider the online hash growth algorithm (see Figure 6). After its initialization, the only
time p[j].distancefromSeed changes is when pebble j is moved and p[j].distancefromSeed is
always updated to maintain the correct distance from pebble p[j] to the hash chain seed.
Proof: After p[j].distancefromSeed’s initialization in section 1 of Figure 6, the value
p[j].distancefromSeed only changes when the next assignment is made in line 3.2:
p[j].distancefromSeed ← totalHashElements
and this occurs exactly when the condition in line 3 holds true since
p[j].distancefromSeed + p[j].Move Increment = totalHashElements,
completing the proof.
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Fact 7 In order to reverse Jakobsson’s algorithm pebbles should be assigned indices in ascending
order.
Proof: This holds by Fact 2.
Fact 8 For each pebble, to find the current position for the purposes of the following proof we can
calculate,
p[j].Position = totalHashElements− p[j].distancefromSeed.
Proof: This holds because Position is a measure of how far from the front of the chain
a pebble currently is. By Fact 4 totalHashElements is always equal to the total number
of elements in the chain and by Facts 5 and 8 distancefromSeed is always the distance
the pebble is from the seed including the seed itself. Thus, we know that we can find how
far from the front of the hash chain (p[j].Position) a pebble is by totalHashElements −
p[j].distancefromSeed.
Fact 9 Consider the online hash growth algorithm. The only time a pebble is moved is when
totalHashElements = t where t← p[j].Move Increment + p[j].distancefromSeed. When
a pebble is moved, then it is moved to the front of the chain.
Fact 10 When the online hash growth algorithm is halted the final pebble is placed at the root
with the seed value, and the next available pebble index.
Fact 10 follows immediately from the code starting at line 4 of Figure 6. Jakobsson assumes
n is a power of two for simplicity [14]. In the case of the online algorithm, values of n other
than powers of two are also critical.
Theorem 1 Suppose that the online algorithm in Figure 6 is halted after generating n total hash
elements. The pebbles associated with the hash chain of size n will be stored at positions equivalent
to the positions in Jakobsson’s algorithm.
Proof: The case where n = 2k, the online and amortized algorithm both have pebbles in the
same positions by Fact 1.
The proof follows by induction on the ranges from [2k, 2k+1) to [2k+1, 2k+2), for k ≥ 2.
Basis: Take a hash chain with k = 2, thus n = 22 = 4 elements as stored by the online by the
algorithm in Figure 6.
p[1].Position = 2
p[1].Move Increment = 4.
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As the hash chain is being grown after n = 4, the first occurrence of CreatePebble is at
22+1 = 5. This pebble is placed at the front of the chain by Fact 5 and labeled p[2] by Fact 7.
Furthermore,
p[2].Position = 4
p[2].Move Increment = 8.
since grow.pebble = 2. Suppose the hash chain growth is halted at n = 5. Due to Fact 10 we
know that the final pebble is placed for the seed. The pebbles are sorted by their Positions.
Growing the hash chain to n = 6, prompts the online hash growth algorithm to check each
pebble for totalHashElements = t = 6 where,
t ← p[j].Move Increment+ p[j].distancefromSeed.
But, totalHashElements 6= t for all j and n = 6.
The algorithm finds tj where
t1 ← p[1].Move Increment+ p[1].distancefromSeed
t2 ← p[2].Move Increment+ p[2].distancefromSeed.
At n = 5 no pebble movement occurs. At n = 6 = t1 the algorithm sets
p[1].distancefromSeed = p[1].distancefromSeed + p[1].Move Increment,
such that
p[1].distancefromSeed = totalHashElements = 6.
Suppose the hash chain growth is halted at n = 7. Again, due to Fact 10 we know that the final
pebble is the seed. Thus, for n = 7 we have pebbles at p[1].Position = 2, p[2].Position = 4
and p[3].Position = 8 by Fact 8.
Inductive Hypothesis: The statement of this Lemma holds for hash chains from n = 2k to
n = 2k+1, for some k ≥ 2.
Inductive Step: Consider the case where n is increased from n = 2k to n = 2k+1 where k ≥ 2.
By the inductive hypothesis we suppose the pebbles are all placed in the correct positions for
n ≤ 2k.
By Jakobsson’s algorithm, for a chain of original size n we know that a pebble is only
discarded when the total number of remaining elements is n/2. Thus, the hash chain growth
algorithm only adds new elements when the total number of pebbles is (n/2) + 1.
Recall, a pebble is always placed at the seed starring at line 4 of the online algorithm, this
assures we always have the proper number of pebbles.
By Fact 11 we know that in Jakobsson’s algorithm only pebble p[1] is moved. Further, it
is always moved a total of p[1].Dest Increment after being moved such that it reaches its
destination. Since
p[i].Dest Increment = p[i].Move Increment
and because pebbles are always moved to the front by the online algorithm by Fact 9, then we
know that pebbles are always moved correctly.
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For each n, there are always enough pebbles to support the total number of elements emitted
in the online algorithm. As just shown, these pebbles are always placed correctly completing
the proof.
5 Further Directions
It would be interesting to extend the algorithms of Sella [25] or Matias and Porat [19] to work
online. That is, suppose we initially have a data structure capable of holding n points of data,
then it would be interesting to be able to generate n+1 elements of data and expand this data
structure suitably, i.e. not doubling it in size.
We have not addressed the tamper-resistant hardware. Likewise, for very small time gran-
ularity, we have not addressed clock drift and related timing issues.
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Appendix: A Proof of Correctness for Jakobsson’s Algorithm
This appendix gives a correctness proof for Jakobsson’s amortized algorithm. This is done to
derive the correctness of the new online algorithm given in this paper. Jakobsson’s paper [14]
does not give a complete proof of correctness for his algorithm. However, our online result
seems to require certain factual statements from the correctness of Jakobsson’s algorithm.
Ultimately, what we show when Jakobsson’s algorithm runs emitting n/2 = 2k hash elements
the remaining pebbles contain hash elements of hash-chain positions 21, 22, 23, . . . , 2k which will
prove the correctness of Jakobsson’s algorithm.
Jakobsson’s work immediately gives the next observation.
Observation 1 Suppose a hash chain has n hash elements and n = 2k, for some integer k ≥ 1 and
Jakobsson’s algorithm is about to start. The k pebbles initially contain hash elements in hash-chain
positions
21, 22, 23, · · · , 2k.
Say Jakobsson’s algorithm is about to start on a hash chain of size 2n. Then k+1 pebbles initially
contain hash elements in hash-chain positions
21, 22, 23, · · · , 2k, 2k+1.
A proof of Observation 1 follows directly from Jakobsson’s setup phase where the pebbles
are initialized.
Definition 5 A pebble p[j] is moved backward if p[j].Position is increased in line 3.1 of the
algorithm in Figure 2. A pebble p[j] is moved forward if p[j].Position is decreased by 2 in line 2.1
of this algorithm.
Fact 11 Only pebble p[1] moves backwards in Jakobsson’s algorithm. Furthermore, it only does so
when Current.position is even.
Proof: This holds since, the major else in section 3 of Figure 2 is the only place Jakobsson’s
algorithm increases any pebble position.
Fact 12 A pebble p[j] moves two hash elements forward in lines 2.1 and 2.2 of Jakobsson’s algo-
rithm only after p[j] was moved previously from the front of the chain by Fact 11.
Proof: In code section 2, making p[j].Position 6= p[j].Destination may only be done by
code in section 3 of Figure 2.
Recall that Jakobsson’s algorithm initially sets p[j].Position = p[j].Destination, for all
pebbles j : σ ≥ j ≥ 1. Where σ is the number of pebbles.
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Fact 13 For any pebble p[j], before or after any invocation of Jakobsson’s algorithm in Figure 2,
the bound holds:
p[j].Position ≥ p[j].Destination,
for all j : σ ≥ j ≥ 1 where p[j].Destination 6= +∞.
Proof: For each pebble j ≥ 1, the values Start Increment = 3×2j and Dest Increment =
2j+1 are both even and never change. Initially in the setup phase
p[j].Destination = 2j
p[j].Position = 2j .
In section 3, the bound p[j].Position ≥ p[j].Destination is always enforced when Cur-
rent.position is even, due to the values of Start Increment and Dest Increment and also
the assignments on lines 3.1 and 3.2,
p[j].Position ← p[j].Position + p[j].Start Increment
p[j].Destination ← p[j].Destination+ p[j].Dest Increment.
However, in section 2 of Figure 2, if p[j].Destination 6= p[j].Position, then p[j].Position
is decremented as follows:
p[j].Position ← p[j].Position − 2.
By Fact 12, during a run of Jakobsson’s algorithm, both
p[1].Position and p[1].Destination
remain even values since lines 3.1 and 3.2 add even values to even values.
Line 3.2 ensures
p[1].Position ≥ p[1].Destination
and line 2.1 decrements p[j].Position by 2, spanning all even numbers going down. Thus
p[j].Position must eventually equal p[j].Destination, completing the proof.
Definition 6 The expression p[j
k
→ i] indicates the pebble initially setup in position j is currently
in position i after k backward moves. The expression p[j
k
→ i] indicates this pebble was previously
in position j, but j is not necessarily the initial position of this pebble in setup.
The expression p[j
0
→ 1] indicates a pebble that was in position j becomes p[1] without
moving backwards. That is, the pebble labeled p[j] becomes p[1] after emission of j − 1 hash
elements.
Note, p[j
k
→ 1] indicates that the pebble initially labeled p[j] has become pebble p[1] exactly k
times. Also, p[1
1
→ j] indicates that the unique pebble initially labeled p[1] is moved backwards
exactly once and eventually relabeled pebble p[j]. Where p[1
1
→ j] is a pebble that was earlier
in position 1 and moved back once, but perhaps it was in another position initially at setup.
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Definition 7 Let D(j, k) be the value of p[j
k
→ i].Destination immediately after k backward
moves of the pebble initially setup as pebble p[j] and became p[i], by the Algorithm in Figure 2.
Thus, by Fact 11, each backward move is initiated when the initial p[j] has become p[1].
Next is a bound on D(j, k), for the initial pebble p[j]:
D(j, k) =
{
2j + 2j+1 if k = 1
D(j, k − 1) + 2j+1 otherwise.
Definition 8 Let P (j, k) be an upper-bound on the value of p[j
k
→ i].Position immediately after
k backward moves of the pebble initially setup as pebble p[j] and became p[i], by the Algorithm in
Figure 2.
Next is a bound on P (j, k), for the initial pebble p[j]:
P (j, k) ≤
{
2j + 3 · 2j if k = 1
P (j, k − 1) + 3 · 2j otherwise.
Fact 14 Immediately after moving pebble p[1] backwards to p[i], the next upper bound holds:
p[j
k
→ i].Position − p[j
k
→ i].Destination ≤ 2j + k
(
3 · 2j
)
− 2j − k
(
2 · 2j
)
≤ k · 2j .
Equality holds immediately after p[j
k
→ i] is placed in position i.
This fact holds by Fact 13.
Fact 15 Consider the Algorithm in Figure 2. Then for every pebble p[j
k
→ 1], it must be that
p[j
k
→ 1].Position = p[j
k
→ 1].Destination,
where neither p[j
k
→ 1].Position = +∞ nor p[j
k
→ 1].Destination = +∞.
Proof: Consider the next function that describes how p[j].Destination works. Note, that
line 3.2 of Figure 2 is the only place the Destination field is changed.
Basis: It must be that
p[j
1
→ 1].Position = p[j
1
→ 1].Destination,
since by the upper-bound in Fact 14,
p[j
1
→ 1].Position − p[j
1
→ 1].Destination ≤ 2j .
However, D(j, 1) = 2j + 2j+1 and by line 2.1 of the algorithm, we must decrement p[j
1
→
1].Position by 2 each of D(j, 1) times. This is because the pebbles are sorted by Position. So
25
immediately after the initial pebble p[j] is moved back, then its destination is D(j, 1). Thus,
after D(j, 1) more hash elements are emitted, then this pebble will be labeled p[1].
Thus, since 2D(j, 1) > 2j , by Fact 13,
p[j
1
→ 1].Position = p[j
1
→ 1].Destination,
completing the basis.
Inductive Hypothesis: Suppose in k ≥ 1 backward moves of the initial pebble p[j] by the
Algorithm in Figure 2, we have
p[j
k
→ 1].Position = p[j
k
→ 1].Destination.
Inductive Step: For some k ≥ 1, consider k+ 1 backward moves of the initial pebble p[j′] by
Algorithm in Figure 2, and this step will show:
p[j′
k+1
−→ 1].Position = p[j′
k+1
−→ 1].Destination.
Start by considering k + 1 backward moves of the initial pebble p[j′], for the sake of a
contradiction suppose,
p[j′
1
→ j
k
→ 1].Position 6= p[j′
1
→ j
k
→ 1].Destination,
and in any case, by Fact 14, the next bound holds:
p[j′
1
→ j].Position − p[j′
1
→ j].Destination ≤ 2j
′
.
However D(j′, 1) = 2j
′+1 + 2j
′
, which means after 2j
′+1 + 2j
′
hash elements are emitted to
take the initial pebble p[j′] to p[1] the first time, then
p[j′
1
→ j].Position
must be decremented by 2 in each run of section 2 of Figure 2 decreasing p[j′
1
→ 1].Position
by at least 2D(j′, 1) > 2j
′
.
Now, by the Inductive Hypothesis it must be that,
p[j
k
→ 1].Position = p[j
k
→ 1].Destination.
giving,
p[j′
k+1
−→ 1].Position = p[j′
k+1
−→ 1].Destination,
indicating our supposition was incorrect, which completes the proof.
Fact 16 Suppose a hash chain starts with n = 2k+1 total hash elements, for some integer k ≥ 1
and Jakobsson’s algorithm runs emitting n/2 = 2k hash elements. Then the pebble initially in
position j < k is moved backwards a total of
2k−j−1
times.
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Proof: By Fact 11, a pebble only moves back when it is in pebble position 1. By Fact 13,
p[j].Position ≥ p[j].Destination,
so the only concern is how p[j].Destination is initialized and how p[j].Destination changes.
After n/2 hash elements are emitted, it takes exactly
(n
2
− 2j
) 1
p[j].Dest Increment
=
(
2k − 2j
) 1
2j+1
= 2j−k−1 −
1
2
,
increments of p[j].Destination by the time the pebble initially at position j is disposed of.
A pebble is disposed of when p[j].Destination ← +∞. In terms of Fact 16, the pebble in
position k+1 is never moved back and the pebble in position k is disposed of when it is moved
back the first time.
Fact 17 Given an n = 2k element hash chain and take the Algorithm in Figure 2. The initial
pebble in position j, for j = k− 1 = log(n/2) is the only pebble that is disposed of by the time the
first n/2 hash elements are emitted.
Proof: For each pebble, the values Start Increment and Dest Increment never change.
Initially in setup p[j].Destination← 2j , for all j : log n ≥ j ≥ 1.
The value p[j].Destination is only increased in line 3.2 of Figure 2. Considering line 3.2
gives the bound
p[j].Destination = 2j + p[j].Dest Increment
p[j].Destination = 2j + 2j+1
p[j].Destination = 3 · 2j .
Pebble p[1] is the only one that is moved back by Fact 11. Further,
3 · 2j > n,
holds for j ≥ log(n/2). But the only mobile pebble that satisfies this constraint is initially in
position j = log(n/2) = k − 1. There is a pebble j = log n at the seed of the hash chain, but
this never moves.
Now, take any initial pebble that started in position j ≤ log(n/4) then by Fact 16, such a
pebble makes 2k−j−1 backward moves by the time n/2 hash elements are emitted. Thus, by the
time the n/2-nd pebble is emitted, the initial pebble p[j] is moved from the starting position
2j to position
2j +
(
2j+1 · 2k−j−1
)
= 2j + 2k,
and the largest j and k may be is log(n/4) and log(n/2), respectively, giving
2j + 2k ≤ 2logn/4 + 2logn/2
≤
3n
4
< n,
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completing the proof.
Fact 18 Suppose a hash chain starts with n = 2k+1 total hash elements, and for some integer
k ≥ 1, while Jakobsson’s algorithm runs emitting the first n/2 = 2k hash elements, let i be the first
placement of p[j → i] between hash elements 2k and 2k+1. Then, Jakobsson’s algorithm will emit
a total of
n
2
−
(
2k−j−1 − 1
)
2j+1 − 2j
hash elements before emitting hash element 2k but immediately after p[j→ i] is placed at position i.
Proof: After Jakobsson’s algorithm emits hash element 2k, a total of n/2 total hash elements
have already been emitted.
By Fact 16 the pebble initially at position j < k is moved backwards 2k−j−1 times. That
is, it appears in pebble position 1, a total of 2k−j−1 times.
The last time this pebble moves backward to position i is the first time it moves to a position
behind hash position 2k. This gives the factor of (2k−j−1 − 1).
Finally, for initial pebble j, since Dest Increment is always 2j+1, each time we move
backwards in Jakobsson’s algorithm, we move Destination back by 2j+1 elements. That is, we
move back a total of (
2k−j−1 − 1
)
2j+1
hash elements by the time the pebble initially labeled j passes hash position 2k.
Furthermore, the initially labeled jth pebble starts at position 2j , so we adjust for the
number of hash elements emitted it takes to traverse p[j
0
→ 1].
Corollary 1 We know that when n/2 hash elements are emitted that all remaining pebbles will
have
p[j].Destination = p[j].Position.
Proof: We know by Fact 18, that there are
n
2
−
(
2k−j−1 − 1
)
2j+1 − 2j
elements that remain to be output before a total of n/2 elements are emitted after each pebble
at original pebble index j is moved for the last time before n/2 elements are emitted.
By Jakobsson’s algorithm we know that each time a pebble at original position j is moved,
it will take,
(3 · 2j − 2j+1)/2
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hash exposures for p[j].Position = p[j].Destination.
Thus, since
n
2
−
(
2k−j−1 − 1
)
2j+1 − 2j > (3 · 2j − 2j+1)/2
we know that when n/2 hash elements are emitted that all remaining pebbles will have p[j].Position =
p[j].Destination. Thus, completing the proof.
The next fact, can also serve as an alternate proof-of-correctness for Jakobsson’s algo-
rithm [14]. It is presented here, since it is needed subsequently.
First, the function R() reindexes the pebble indices from one power of two down to the next
lowest power of two. When n/2 pebbles are emitted, then the total number of remaining hash
elements goes from n = 2k+1 down to n = 2k.
Rk(lk+1) = lk+1 − 2
k,
where lk+1 is the hash element ≥ 2
k+1 contained by pebble index k + 1, and Rk(lk+1) is the
adjusted index of the hash element ≥ 2k.
Fact 19 Suppose a hash chain starts with n = 2k+1 total hash elements, for some integer k ≥ 1
and Jakobsson’s algorithm runs emitting n/2 = 2k hash elements. Then the remaining pebbles
contain hash elements of hash-chain positions
21, 22, 23, · · · , 2k.
Proof: This proof follows by induction on the algorithm in Figure 2. Setting k = 2 ensures
sections 1,2 and 3 of Jakobsson’s algorithm will run (see Figure 2). The base case will be k = 2,
so n = 23 = 8, exposing n/2 elements to get k − 1, n = 2k−1 total elements.
Basis: Take a hash chain with n = 23 total hash elements. Thus, n = 2k+1, so k = 2. Then the
setup phase of Jakobsson’s algorithm assigns pebbles to hold hash elements in positions 21, 22
and 23.
Now, suppose n/2 = 4 hash elements are exposed, thus the algorithm in Figure 2 is called
4 times.
By Fact 17 only one pebble, the pebble associated with the 2k position will be discarded.
This leaves 2k+1 − 1 = 2 pebbles remaining. One of these pebbles is associated with the root
and will not change. For the remaining pebble associated with the 21 position
P (j, 1) = 2j + 3 · 2j = 21 + 3 · 21 = 8
D(j, 1) = 2j + 2j+1 = 21 + 22 = 6.
Now, n = 2k = 4 elements remain. In order to put position l, which is in terms of base
2k+1 hash chain, in terms of the base 2k hash chain we have our two remaining pebbles at
Rk=2(6g=3) = 2, and Rk=2(8g=3) = 4, where g = k + 1. Since k = 2 our remaining pebbles are
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at positions 21 and 22 or, 21 . . . 2k.
Inductive Hypothesis: Suppose that for a hash chain of size 2k+1 where k ≥ 2 after Jakobs-
son’s algorithm runs emitting n/2 = 2k hash elements that the remaining pebbles contain hash
elements of hash chain positions
21, 22, 23, . . . , 2k.
Inductive Step: Consider n/2 hash element exposures for a hash chain with n = 2k+1 total
elements where k ≥ 2. This step will show that the pebbles will be placed at positions equivalent
to 21, 22, . . . , 2k.
Again, by Fact 17 only one pebble, the pebble associated with the 2k position will be
discarded. This leaves k − 1 pebbles remaining. One of these pebbles is associated with the
root and will not change.
By Fact 15 for all pebbles p[j
k
→ 1], it must be that
p[j
k
→ 1].Position = p[j
k
→ 1].Destination.
For all remaining pebbles after n/2 hash exposures,
p[j].Position = P (j, q),
p[j].Destination = D(j, q).
By Corollary 1 we know that for all remaining pebbles p[j].Position = p[j].Destination
when n/2 elements are output and thus all pebbles are inactive.
Further, since we know that p[j].Position = p[j].Destination the remaining pebble posi-
tions are defined by the destination function D(j,m) as defined earlier where m is the number
of times the pebble at original position j is moved back and
D(j,m) = 2j +m · 2j+1.
By Fact 16 m = 2k−j−1 for each pebble at initial position j over the first n/2 hash element
exposures.
Therefore,
D(j, 2k−j−1) = 2j + 2k−j−1 · 2j+1
D(j, 2k−j−1) = 2j + 2k
given in terms of base n = 2k+1 total elements. To put this result in terms of our new hash
chain n = 2k we simply apply the Rk(lk+1) function to get
Rk(2
j + 2k) = 2j + 2k − 2k = 2j ,
where j = 1, · · · , k.
Thus, by the inductive hypothesis it must be that when Jakobsson’s algorithm runs emitting
n/2 = 2k hash elements the remaining pebbles contain hash elements of hash-chain positions
21, 22, 23, . . . , 2k, thus completing the proof.
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